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1. Introduction: Description of the national sample 
 
 
Between early November and mid-December 2004, a total of 1010 young people, aged 
between 15 and 25 years old, have been interviewed in France. For the following analysis, the 
data base  has been adjusted for specific variations by taking an average of results on the basis 
of 1000 interviewees. 
As illustrated by table 1,the main socio-demographic characteristics of the sample show the 
specificity of the social experience of the French youth today.  Most of the young people are still 
in the educational system (64%)  : 42% are at school and 20% have entered university. Those 
who are already concerned by working life are less numerous : one third of the sample (34%) 
has already left school (26% have a paid work and 8% are unemployed).Within this working 
group , 60% do not have any high-school diploma (Baccalauréat). 
This social and educational cleavage among the French young people creates some specific  
conditions regarding their political experience and participation. To be or not to be educated has 
a strong impact not only on the chances to get a job, a stable status , a social autonomy, but 
also on the process of the political socialization during this period of life. 
 
The majority of the respondents (64%) declares that their standard of living is on average while 
19% estimate that their income is below average. The majority of the respondents live in an 
urban area (44% in big cities, 30% in small or medium ones). Only 26% live in a rural area. Most 
of them still live together with their parents (69%).  More than half of the respondents have 
parents who do not have a high-school diploma. 
 
Almost all the respondents are French citizens (97%), and 94% are born in France. As we have 
no information about the citizenship of their parents, it is not possible to identify those with 
immigrants origins. Nevertheless 7% of the people declared themselves as being Muslims. This 
group is less favoured than the rest of the sample. Among the young Muslims, 31% declare to 
have a low or very low standard of living, 25% are in paid work and 10% are unemployed. One 
third (33%) is not educated, and 78% have parents who are not too. 
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Table 1: Socio-demographic characteristics 
 
 Number Percentage 
Gender 
Male 510 51 
Female 490 49 
Age in 4 categories 
15-17 ans 297 30 
18-20 ans 299 30 
21-23 ans 231 23 
24-25 ans 173 17 
Nationality 
French 970 97 
Other 30 3 
Citizenship 
French people born in France 941 94 
French people born abroad 32 3 
No French citizenship 27 3 
Actual Household 
Alone 105 11 
With parents 693 69 
With partner 156 16 
Other 46 5 
Do you have children ? 
No 931 93 
Yes 69 7 
Type of settlement 
Urban area 438 44 
Small or medium city 304 30 
Rural area 257 26 
Status 
In paid work 260 26 
College or high school 422 42 
Students 198 20 
Unemployed 80 8 
Other 40 4 
Diploma in 4 categories 
Still at school < full maturity 433 43 
Still at school >= full maturity 204 20 
Workers < full maturity 236 24 
Worker >= full maturity 125 12 
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Diploma/gender/activity (Dipsexac) 
Young men working< full maturity 133 13 
Young women working <full maturity 102 10 
Young men working >= full maturity 58 6 
Young women working >= full maturity 67 7 
Young men still at school 318 32 
Young women still at school 320 32 
Age when finished education 
Still at school 638 64 
Finished at age between 12 and 15 13 1 
Finished at age 16 44 4 
Finished at age 17 52 5 
Finished at age 18 76 8 
Finished at age 19 45 5 
Finished at age between 20 and 25 131 13 
Higher diploma of both parents 
Don’t know/answer refused 89 9 
Diploma<high-school diploma 533 53 
Diploma>= high-school diploma 378 38 
Actual standard of living 
Very low/low 192 19 
Average 635 64 
High/Very high 165 17 
Religion in 4 catégories 
Catholics 461 48 
Muslims 72 7 
Other religions 42 4 
No religion 391 40 
Religiousness 
Very religious 75 8 
Somewhat religious 195 20 
A little religious 301 31 
Not at all religious 394 41 
 
 
2. Political Interest, Competence and Knowledge 
 
2.1 Political interest and competence 
 
Young generations are always suspected to be less interested in politics and less politicised 
than their elders. But this observation is not really founded. They are more or less as interested 
in politics than the rest of the population. What they keep at distance is politicians and political 
affairs concerning partisan quarrels and electoral competition. But they are concerned by 
national issues and international problems. So their answer to this question depends on what 
we consider as politics. 
 
Political interest (%) 
Very, fairly interested 35 
Not very interested 35 
Not at all interested 29 
DK-AR 1 
Total 100 
  
 
35% of the respondents declare to be very interested or interested in politics, 64% are not very 
interested or not at all interested. Young men are more interested than young women 
(38%/33%), and the oldest more than the youngest (40%/25%).   
The level of education has a strong effect. The more they are educated, the more they are 
interested. Educated young men are the most interested whereas not educated young women 
are the least (47%/21%). 
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Table 3: Interest in politics and competence 
Political interest Political competence
Total 35 21
Khi-deux 0,000
Very, fairly interested(n=354) 30
Not very interested(n=348) 13
Not at all interested(n=290) 17
Gender Khi-deux 0,297 0,014
Young man (n=510) 38 24
Young woman (n=490) 33 17
Age in 2 categories Khi-deux 0,000 0,027
15-17 years (n=297) 25 19
18-25 years (n=703) 40 21
Khi-deux 0,111 0,009
YM working/< full maturity (n=133) 34 15
YW working/< full maturity(n=103) 21 14
 YM working/>= full maturity(n=58) 47 34
YW working/>= full maturity(n=67) 42 22
YM still at school(n=318) 38 25
YW still at school(n=320) 34 18
Status Khi-deux 0,000 0,006
In paid work(n=260) 36 20
At school(n=423) 29 21
Higher studies(n=198) 52 23
Unemployed(n=79) 33 18
Other (n=40) 28 15
Khi-deux 0,000 0,000
Left (n=359) 55 26
Neither nor(n=356) 21 14
Right (n=123) 54 27
DK (n=114) 6 17
AR (n=35) 36 31
Khi-deux 0,000 0,000
Both at least once(n=154) 55 21
Only one parent at least once(n=81) 56 26
Both never(n=678) 31 20
Unknown (n=87) 14 20
Khi-deux 0,000 0,006
Both always(n=577) 42 21
Only one parent always(n=68) 42 20
Both not always(n=305) 25 18
Unknown (n=51) 14 29
Left right scale
Parental non conventional 
participation
Parental electoral 
participation
Very, fairly interested Rarely-never
Political interest
Diploma/gender/activity
 
 
 
To have a left wing or a right wing orientation is correlated to a higher level of interest 
(respectively 55% and 54%, around 20 points more than the average level). Young people who 
have no political orientation, neither left nor right are also the least interested in politics (21%, 
15 points less than the average). 
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Parental influence has an important effect. When the young have parents who are also 
interested in politics, who participate to demonstrations or who vote at each election, they are 
themselves more interested in politics than the average. 55% declare they are very interested 
and interested among those who have both parents having already demonstrated, 42% when 
their both parents are regular voters (when their parents don’t vote regularly, they are only 25% 
to be interested). 
 
Impression that politics is something complicated (%) 
Always 17 
Often 29 
Sometimes 32 
Rarely-never 20 
DK 2 
Total 100 
 
Asked about their feeling that politics is something too complicated to understand it easily, eight 
out of ten do agree and only 21% feel competent and not disoriented. Politics is not very 
accessible, even for young people who are very interested in politics : only 30% among them 
feel competent. Gender makes again a difference, whatever the high level of education : 34% of 
the young men having the baccalaureate feel competent, only 22% of the young women with 
the same level of education. 
 
 
2.2 Political knowledge 
 
This gender gap is even more visible concerning political knowledge. The sample is equally 
divided in two parts : 50% have a weak knowledge (16% very weak, 34% middle weak) and 
50% have a strong one (12% a very strong, 38% a middle strong). But 55% of the young 
women have a weak knowledge (46% of the young men) whereas 54% of the young men have 
a strong knowledge (45% of the women). Even when their level of education is high, their 
political knowledge is always lower than the young men ones. 
 
 
 
 
 10 
Table 4: Political knowledge 
Total 16 34 38 12
Khi-deux
Very, fairly interested(n=354) 5 28 47 21
Not very interested(n=348) 17 37 36 9
Not at all interested(n=290) 27 40 28 5
Gender Khi-deux
Young man (n=510) 14 32 41 13
Young woman (n=490) 18 37 34 11
Age in 2 categories Khi-deux
15-17 years (n=297) 20 36 35 9
18-25 years (n=703) 15 34 39 13
Khi-deux
Still at school < full maturity 20 36 35 9
Still at school >= full maturity 7 27 44 22
Working < full maturity 22 39 32 7
Working >= full maturity 7 31 46 15
Khi-deux
YM working/< full maturity (n=133) 20 38 35 8
YW working/< full maturity(n=103) 25 40 28 7
 YM working/>= full maturity(n=58) 8 34 44 14
YW working/>= full maturity(n=67) 7 28 46 18
YM still at school(n=318) 13 30 42 14
YW still at school(n=320) 18 37 34 12
Khi-deux
Left (n=359) 7 31 45 16
Neither nor(n=356) 20 36 35 8
Right (n=123) 6 30 46 19
DK (n=114) 39 38 21 3
AR (n=35) 15 47 24 15
Diploma/gender/activity
0,003
Left right scale
0,000
0,078
0,067
Diploma
0,000
Medium weak Medium strong Strong
Political interest
0,000
Weak
 
 
Interest in politics and ideological orientation have a direct impact. More young people are 
interested in politics more they know about politics. Among those who are very interested and 
interested 21% have a high score of political knowledge ; when they are not at all interested 
they are only 5% in the same case. 
 
Young people who locate themselves neither left nor right, are more numerous to have a weak 
knowledge (56%) ; those who locate on the left or on the right have a higher level of political 
knowledge  (respectively 61% and 65%). To have ideological and political orientations is directly 
linked to the interest and to the knowledge young people can express towards politics.    
 
 
2.3 Attitudes towards politics 
 
This first overview of French young people interest and competence in politics gives an idea of 
the way politics takes place in their daily life. Politics is not out of their experience and of their 
concerns. 56% declare their fathers are interested in politics, 47% their mothers, 27% their best 
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friend. They are used to get some political news : 64% follow the news every day or several 
times a week. Television is the media the most used to get it : 68% watch TV first, the others 
media come far away behind (5% use the radio, 7% the newspapers, 7% the Internet).    
They are more concerned by national (48%) and international (41%) aspects than by local 
(33%) and European (33%) ones.  
 
Nevertheless, when they are asked about what is politics for them, the image they give of the 
political universe is firstly negative: 69% of the young people believe that politics means empty 
promises, 64% think it is a game played by old men, 57% believe that politics is only about 
corruption and 50% think that politics does not address their expectations. A majority of the 
young people seems very disillusioned by politics. Only 38% believe it is a way to create a 
better world… Nevertheless, if politics is mainly associated with negative items, it is also linked 
to conventional understanding: “party activities” and “voting” reach the highest level of 
agreement (69%), to describe what they understand by politics. Moreover, more than half of the 
sample perceives politics as a way to solve international problems (58%) or societal conflicts 
(52%) and to take care of social issues (50%). 
 
Figure 1: Attitudes towards politics: “politics is…” (sorted by agreement) 
38
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29
29
31
33
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29
22
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22
23
27
21
21
18
10
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16
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0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Way to create a better world
Ignorant of my important issues
Necessary for social issues
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Corrupted
Parliamentary discussions
Solving international problems
Game played by old men
Voting
Party activities
Empty promises
Agree (1,2) Neither nor (3) Disagree (4,5)
 
 
To better understand why the French youth is so disappointed and critical about politics, we 
built an indicator of political distrust based on answers given to question 23 item 7 (empty 
promises) and item 11 (corrupted)1. Half of the respondents (46%) are strongly distrustful of 
politics. 
                                               
1 No distrust = respondent disagree with all items – Medium = respondent agree with one item – Strong= respondent 
agree with both items. 
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Oldest people are more disillusioned (the rate of defiance is 38% within 15-18 years group and 
52% within 24-25 years group). Working people are more cautious than students (53% vs. 
42%). In addition, diploma and standard of living are also explicative variables: working people 
with a high level of education are less disillusioned than those who have no diploma (48% vs. 
56%). Working young men are the most critical, 59% of them have a strong distrust. 
Moreover, people who are not at all interested in politics are those who are the most cynical, 
indeed, 52% of them are strongly distrustful. Politicised young people are less inclined to have 
such a distrust, especially if they locate themselves on the right; whereas 71% of the people 
who refuse to give their political position are strongly distrustful. Such a suspicion expresses 
their distance towards politics and the partisan game. 
 
Table 5: Political distrust 
No distrust Medium Strong
Total 24 30 46
Khi-deux
Very, fairly interested(n=354) 29 31 40
Not very interested(n=348) 21 32 47
Not at all interested(n=290) 21 27 52
Age in 4 categories Khi-deux
15-17 years (n=297) 31 31 38
18-20 years (n=298) 19 33 48
21-23 years (n=231) 25 26 49
24-25 years (n=173) 18 30 52
Khi-deux
Very low - low(n=193) 20 26 54
Medium (n=635) 23 30 47
High - very high(n=165) 31 36 33
Khi-deux
Still at school < full maturity(n=433) 27 33 40
Still at school >= full maturity(n=204) 28 25 46
Workers < full maturity(n=235) 14 29 56
Workers >= full maturity(n=125) 23 28 48
Khi-deux
Workers (n=360) 18 29 53
Students (n=638) 27 31 42
Khi-deux
YM working/< full maturity (n=133) 14 27 59
YW working/< full maturity(n=103) 16 32 52
 YM working/>= full maturity(n=58) 28 29 43
YW working/>= full maturity(n=67) 20 27 53
YM still at school(n=318) 27 31 42
YW still at school(n=320) 28 31 42
Status Khi-deux
In paid work(n=260) 16 28 56
At school(n=423) 28 33 39
Higher studies(n=198) 28 26 45
Unemployed(n=79) 23 32 46
Other (n=40) 13 25 63
Khi-deux
Left (n=359) 20 35 46
Neither nor(n=356) 25 26 49
Right (n=123) 34 28 38
DK (n=114) 25 35 40
AR (n=35) 11 17 71
Diploma/gender/activity
0,017
0,000
Left right scale
0,001
Diploma
0,000
Workers / students
0,000
Political interest
0,033
0,004
Actual standard of living
0,002
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Three important cleavages have been identified to understand the way young people 
interest in politics and feel competent. 
 
The first one is related to the age. Competence and interest grow according to the age. 
Youth is a period of intense political socialization and aging gives more knowledge and 
experience. 
 
The second one concerns the gender gap. Young men have always more familiarity and 
more competence with politics and feel more concerned. 
 
The third one is due to the level of education. More young people are educated more they 
are interested in politics. 
 
But general attitudes towards politics are for most young people negative. And French 
politicians have to face a strong distrust and a lack of confidence, which are particularly 
problematic among the not educated young but also significant among educated ones. 
 
3. Ideological Orientations and Partisan Choices 
 
The French youth is more leftist oriented than rightist. This ideological orientation among young 
people is a constant specificity for almost Strongy years now. And except the middle of the 90’s, 
at the end of a long period of cohabitation between left and right which has crumbled the 
political and ideological marks and has disenchanted a bit the population, the youth has always 
given more support to the left than to the right. Today 36% of the entire sample locate 
themselves on the left, only 13% on the right. Among the oldest, having the right to vote, the left 
has the preference of 40% of the 18-25 years old, the right only of 13%. Among the entire 
population in France, the preference for the left is actually relatively equivalent (38%). We can 
notice that Muslim French young people seem to be more leftist and radical : 49% locate 
themselves on the left and none on the right. 
 
The political filiation between the young and their parents is important; 69% of the respondents 
declare to have the same ideological affiliation than their parents (left, right or a political) If the 
preference for the left is still dominant, we can notice an erosion of the capacity to locate on a 
left-right scale, among the youth, and more generally among the entire population. The left-right 
cleavage still functions as a basic ideological mark to interpret the political life and the political 
issues. But it is less and less relevant. In the survey barely half the sample clearly identify to the 
left or to the right (49%, and only 39% among the youngest, 15-17 years old). A large proportion 
answers neither left nor right (36%), or are not able to answer to the question (12%, and 22% 
among the youngest), and consequently give not a relevant signification to this distinction. We 
have to keep in mind that more than half of the respondents (51%) do not locate themselves on 
a left-right scale. 
 
The possibility to locate between left and right strongly depends on the level of the interest in 
politics. More the young people are interested in politics more they locate themselves between 
left and right : 64% who are very interested and interested choose the left (55%) or the right 
(19%) and are really less numerous to give the answer neither left nor right (only 21%). A 
contrario, young people who are not interested in politics, and especially those who are not at 
all interested, are few to locate on the left or on the right. To locate oneself within the ideological 
and political space is strongly correlated to the interest and to the competence you feel towards 
politics. And this competence itself depends on the level of education. 
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Table 6: Left-right orientation 
Total 36 36 13 12 3
Khi-deux
Very, fairly interested(n=354) 55 21 19 2 3
Not very interested(n=348) 32 43 9 14 1
Not at all interested(n=290) 18 46 8 20 7
Age in 2 categories Khi-deux
15-17 years (n=297) 28 36 11 22 2
18-25 years (n=703) 40 36 13 7 4
Khi-deux
Still at school < full maturity(n=433) 32 38 9 18 3
Still at school >= full maturity(n=204) 44 28 17 6 4
Workers < full maturity(n=235) 34 43 11 8 4
Workers >= full maturity(n=125) 44 30 19 4 3
Khi-deux
YM working/< full maturity (n=133) 39 38 11 8 4
YW working/< full maturity(n=103) 27 50 11 9 4
 YM working/>= full maturity(n=58) 41 24 22 5 7
YW working/>= full maturity(n=67) 45 35 15 3 2
YM still at school(n=318) 35 33 13 15 4
YW still at school(n=320) 37 36 10 14 3
Status Khi-deux
In paid work(n=260) 40 36 14 6 4
At school(n=423) 32 38 10 18 3
Higher studies(n=198) 44 28 17 7 4
Unemployed(n=79) 36 42 10 10 1
Other (n=40) 24 42 13 16 5
Khi-deux
Catholics (n=461) 33 35 18 11 2
Muslims (n=72) 49 33 0 14 4
Other religions (n=43) 38 43 17 2 0
No religion (n=391) 39 38 9 11 4
0,000
Religion
0,000
Diploma
0,000
Diploma/gender/activity
0,018
AR
Political interest
0,000
0,000
Left
Neither left nor 
right
Right DK
 
 
 
We have seen before the link between interest in politics and education. And we verify again the 
importance of the level of education on the ability to produce political opinions and attitudes. 
Those who have a low level of education, and especially those who have left school without the 
baccalaureate, are more numerous to not locate between left and right : 43% (only 30% among 
young people who have interrupted their studies later and who have a minima a high school 
diploma). This effect is particularly visible among not educated young women : 50% say they 
are neither left nor right (38% of young men in the same situation). According to the status and 
the level of education, the highest gap is between unemployed and students (42% of the first 
don’t locate between left and right only 28% of the students do the same, - 14 points).  
 
According to their dominant left wing orientation, young people express partisan proximities 
which give advantage to the left camp : 13% are very close or close from the extreme left, 10% 
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from the Communist Party, 27% from the Socialist Party, 27% from the Greens. Only 6% say 
they are very close or close from the UDF, 8% from UMP, 6% from extreme-right. 
Partisan closeness, whatever the party (extreme-right), is always higher among young people 
who are interested in politics, and is also more expressed among the oldest. The very young 
have more difficulties to situate themselves on the left-right scale and also among the political 
and partisan area. They are still more distant and less concerned. 
 
Table 7: Partisan proximity 
Ext. Left PC PS Greens UDF UMP Ext. Right 
13 10 27 27 6 8 6
0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
21 17 43 41 10 14 6
12 8 21 25 3 7 5
5 3 14 13 3 2 5
Age in 2 categories 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
9 7 19 25 2 5 4
15 11 30 28 7 10 6
0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
11 7 22 24 3 5 5
13 12 39 38 10 12 3
16 13 20 23 5 7 9
14 10 38 30 12 15 7
0,347 0,117 0,055 0,687 0,002 0,007 0,217
14 12 23 26 4 6 10
17 15 17 20 6 8 7
15 10 31 32 19 24 9
13 11 43 29 6 6 5
12 12 27 27 5 9 6
12 6 28 30 5 7 3
Status 0,000 0,001 0,001 0,007 0,000 0,000 0,000
15 12 27 26 8 11 7
11 7 22 23 2 5 5
13 13 39 37 11 12 3
20 16 26 29 6 9 11
8 0 20 27 5 3 10
0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
28 23 64 45 3 3 2
6 3 8 20 2 2 3
3 1 3 17 30 50 29
5 3 5 17 3 3 3
3 3 3 0 3 3 0
NB:
Ext. left = LO, LCR, PT
Ext right = FN, MNR
Neither nor(n=356)
Right (n=123)
DK (n=114)
AR (n=35)
Unemployed(n=79)
Other (n=40)
Left right scale
Khi-deux
Left (n=359)
Khi-deux
In paid work(n=260)
At school(n=423)
Higher studies(n=198)
 YM working/>= full maturity(n=58)
YW working/>= full maturity(n=67)
YM still at school(n=318)
YW still at school(n=320)
Still at school >= full maturity(n=204)
Workers < full maturity(n=235)
Workers >= full maturity(n=125)
Diploma/gender/activity
Khi-deux
YM working/< full maturity (n=133)
YW working/< full maturity(n=103)
18-25 years (n=703)
Diploma
Khi-deux
Still at school < full maturity(n=433)
Not very interested(n=348)
Not at all interested(n=290)
Khi-deux
15-17 years (n=297)
Total
Political interest
Khi-deux
Very, fairly interested(n=354)
 
 
The level of education and the status introduce some distinctions which reveal the political 
cleavages present in the entire population and which explain the actual political game in France. 
Among the left camp, some divisions are visible. Young people, not educated, already at work 
or who are looking for a job, are more in favour of extreme-left and communist left than students 
who express more closeness to the socialist left and to the Greens. Among unemployed young 
people, 20% feel very close or close from extreme-left (13% among the students). Among the 
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students, 39% feel very close or close from the Socialist Party (26% among unemployed), 37% 
from the Greens (29% among unemployed). 
 
These divisions reveal a social fracture within French young people which crosses the left, but 
which is also visible at the opposite of the partisan spectrum. The electoral capacity of the 
extreme-right in France for almost twenty years to gain some support from social categories 
particularly touched by precariousness and by changes on the market labour, has created a 
scission within the right camp and a tripartition of the political space. Young men, not educated, 
having a job or unemployed, are more numerous to feel some closeness to extreme-right than 
the rest of the youth (10% of the young men having a job, 11% of the unemployed).   
 
Positions on the left-right scale are coherent with the partisan proximities. Closeness to the 
parties is always higher when young people can locate between left and right. But it is 
interesting to note that among those who answer neither left nor right, there is one party which 
gains more than the others their favour, the Greens, 20%. 
 
To look at which parties young people reject the most confirms the relative consensus about the 
acceptance of the socialist left and of the Greens. Both are the less rejected. 31% of the young 
answer they feel very distant or distant from the Socialist Party and 28% from the Greens. 
Within the left camp, extreme-left is less rejected than the Communist Party, a result which 
confirms the general sympathy within the French youth for some radical movements, coming 
from the troskyst and revolutionary tradition. Extreme-right is the party which they reject the 
most : more than two third (69%) declare they feel very distant and distant from it. Young people 
who locate themselves on the left are the most numerous to reject the extreme-right (91%). 
Those who locate on the right are only 58% to express the same distance.  
 
Classical right parties are more rejected than classical left parties (except the Communist 
Party), a result which confirms the more leftist political orientation of the youth today. 
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Table 8: The most rejected parties 
PC PS Greens UDF UMP Ext. Right
Total 52 31 28 50 50 69
Khi-deux 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
Very, fairly interested(n=354) 54 27 22 58 59 76
Not very interested(n=348) 51 30 26 49 47 71
Not at all interested(n=290) 51 36 37 43 45 57
Age in 2 categories Khi-deux 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
15-17 years (n=297) 46 29 26 39 40 62
18-25 years (n=703) 55 31 29 55 55 72
Khi-deux 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
Still at school < full maturity(n=433) 49 30 28 44 44 63
Still at school >= full maturity(n=204) 58 28 24 56 56 80
Workers < full maturity(n=235) 49 33 32 56 54 66
Workers >= full maturity(n=125) 59 34 27 55 56 77
Khi-deux 0,117 0,055 0,687 0,002 0,007 0,217
YM working/< full maturity (n=133) 49 30 29 57 56 66
YW working/< full maturity(n=103) 49 36 36 53 52 65
 YM working/>= full maturity(n=58) 58 32 25 49 51 72
YW working/>= full maturity(n=67) 61 34 29 59 61 80
YM still at school(n=318) 53 30 26 47 48 69
YW still at school(n=320) 51 28 27 49 48 68
Status Khi-deux 0,001 0,001 0,007 0,000 0,000 0,000
In paid work(n=260) 52 32 29 55 54 72
At school(n=423) 50 30 29 44 45 62
Higher studies(n=198) 58 28 24 56 55 79
Unemployed(n=79) 49 37 31 60 59 66
Other (n=40) 55 30 27 43 48 63
Khi-deux 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
Left (n=359) 48 12 22 73 77 91
Neither nor(n=356) 54 38 28 45 44 63
Right (n=123) 84 72 52 33 23 58
DK (n=114) 38 27 23 30 30 47
AR (n=35) 20 17 18 14 14 21
NB:
Ext right = FN, MNR
Diploma
Diploma/gender/activity
Left right scale
Ext left= LO, LCR, PT
Political interest
 
 
According to the status and to the level of education, we can observe the same cleavages than 
before. More young people are educated, more they express a distance towards extremist 
parties, above all towards extreme-right (79% among students), but also towards extreme-left 
(52% among students/45% within the whole sample).Unemployed and not educated young 
people are less reticent to extremism. But we can observe a difference according to the gender 
: young women are less distant from the extreme-left and young men from the extreme-right. 
 
This overview of ideological attitudes and partisan proximities among the French young 
people give an idea of their acceptance of the political game and of the partisan space. 
We will point three main results, which are linked to the political behaviours we will 
examine later. 
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The first one we have to keep in mind is the prevalent leftist orientation among young 
people who continue to give some signification to the classical left-right cleavage, and 
who, more or less, continue to interpret the political space with this elementary marker. 
But half of the young people, and particularly the youngest, don’t recognize this 
traditional partition. Answering they are neither left nor right, they also express they have 
more difficulties to adopt the partisan game and to play with it. A part important of the 
youth is not concerned by politics, does not have any partisan identification, and stays 
out of the game. 
 
The second one is the gap between educated and not educated young people. Attitudes 
and political choices are strongly linked to the educational background, which is the 
most discriminating variable. Sympathy for extremism, on the right or on the left, is more 
important among not educated who encounter more difficulties and precariousness on 
the labour market. 
 
The third one is the weakness of the classical right parties (UDF, UMP), which have 
actually the executive and the parliamentary powers in France)  and the attractiveness of 
the Socialist Party and of the Greens. Especially among the educated youth and among 
the students, these two parties develop some consensual attitudes. 
4. Voting, non voting, electoral participation 
 
Since recently, the registration on the electoral lists of the young people were not automatic. 
And an important proportion of the French youth was not registered, around a quarter between 
the age of 18 and 20 years old. In 1997, a new preview makes the registration automatic at the 
age of 18. The number of not registered in France has been reduced and has dropped from 9%, 
a constant proportion during the last twenty years, to 4% today.  
 
If we consider, as a basis to know how many young people are registered in our sample the 
declaration of those who were eligible at the last European elections, only 7% are not. Among 
them there is a strong proportion of young men, not educated. Compared to the quarter they 
were before 1997, registration has really progressed among the youth. But compared to the 
whole population, there is still a difference between the young people and their elders, probably 
due to the fact they move more and change of address. 
 
Around six young people out of ten (59%) consider the act of voting as effective. Only 13% think 
it’s not effective It’s even the most effective political action to take decisions concerning the 
society, before to work in an association (42%) or to participate to a demonstration (26%). So 
voting is still considered as a real democratic tool to weight on the political system, to orientate 
policies, to maintain democracy.  
 
But if they are now numerous to be registered and if they think that voting is important and 
efficient, they also can abstain at the elections. In France, whatever the type of elections, young 
people abstain always more than the elders.  
 
In the survey, we have an over representation of voters, around 10 points more than in the 
reality. This is probably due to the fact that young people have been asked a long time since the 
date of the elections (two years and a half from the first round of the last general elections 2002 
and six months from the European elections June 2004). But it shows also the difficulty for the 
young people to acknowledge their abstention. Voting is still considered as  a normative 
behaviour which engages responsibility and consciousness, and to not vote can be seen as a 
fault regarding the obligation of a citizen. 
 
Near half of the sample (48%) aged 18-20 years has already voted, 74% of the 21-23 years old, 
and 73% of the 24-25 years old. The experience of voting seems familiar. 
 21 
 
In 2002, at general elections, 47% of the sample were eligible, and two third of them (62%) 
have voted. Among the voters, women are more numerous than men (64%/59%), and educated 
people more than not educated ones (71% of the students, 51% only of the unemployed). We 
can count more non voters among the leftists than among the rightists (32%/19%), a gap which 
confirms the lack of support Jospin has encountered among his own camp.  
In 2004, at European elections, 61% were eligible, half of them has voted (52%). Again, there is 
a difference according the gender, young women have voted more than young men (55%/49%), 
and according the status, students have voted more than unemployed (57%/44%). Young 
people who are neither left nor right have voted less than those who locate themselves between 
left and right (37%, 62% among the leftists, 74% among the rightists).  
 
Constant non voting is usually more important among young people than among their elders, 
and strongly correlated to sociological and political parameters. But it is the alternance of voting 
and non voting which is more and more widespread and indicates an new kind of electoral 
behaviour, especially among people who are educated and also interested in politics. Looking at 
the participation at the two last elections, General 02 and European 04, 44% of the sample in 
age to vote at the general elections 2002, have voted to each election, 38% have abstained 
twice, and 18% have voted at only one. Constant non voters are more numerous among people 
not at all interested in politics (57%), among young men (42% whereas only 34% among young 
women have abstained twice), and also among those who have not a full maturity degree (51% 
among the young already on the labour market without it, only 33% when they have a high 
school diploma). Constant voting is more widespread among young people  very interested in 
politics (58%), among young women n (49%, only 39% among men) and among educated. But 
intermittent voting concerns 21% of the young very interested in politics, and most often 
students (23%),  some scores which indicate the attendance of a political abstention among the 
youth.  
 
Some characteristics distinguish voters and non voters at these two last elections in France. 
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Table 9: Abstention at General elections 2002 and at European elections 2004 
 
Young people who abstain are usually less interested in politics. At European elections 2004, 
among those who were very interested and interested only 31% have not voted, and 25% at the 
first round of general elections in 2002, expressing with their abstention a protest attitude 
towards the political game and the partisan offer.  Among those who are not at all interested, 
they represent the double in 2004 and in 2002 (respectively 66% and 56%), and their abstention 
has another signification, it is less political and shows more distance and more indifference 
towards politics. Again, the effect of the educational background is important and corroborates 
this distinction between these two kinds of abstention, political one and sociological one. Non 
voting is well known among not educated young people, and especially  among unemployed 
(56%). 
 
Young people in rural areas, where the social control is more important, abstain less than in 
urban areas. The context of the socialization seems to be important. Within the family, the fact 
  Abstention 2002 Abstention 2004 
 Total 38 48 
Khi-deux 0,000 0,000 Political interest 
Very, fairly interested(n=354) 25 31 
  Not very interested(n=348) 44 56 
  Not at all interested (n=290) 56 66 
Khi-deux 0,020 0,204 Diploma 
Still at school < maturity(n=433) 36 46 
  Still at school >= maturity (n=204) 29 43 
  Working < maturity (n=235) 47 54 
  Working >= maturity (n=125) 37 48 
Status Khi-deux 0,008 0,105 
  In paid work (n=260) 40 50 
  At school (n=423) 32 44 
  Higher studies (n=198) 28 42 
  Unemployed (n=79) 49 56 
  Other (n=40) 58 64 
Khi-deux 0,029 0,002 Type of settlement 
Urban area (n=438) 44 55 
  Small or medium city (n=304) 36 45 
  Rural area (n=257) 30 39 
Khi-deux 0,000 0,000 Left right scale 
Left (n=359) 31 38 
  Neither nor (n=356) 53 63 
  Right (n=123) 19 26 
  DK (n=114) 57 77 
  AR (n=35) 5 46 
Khi-deux 0,000 0,000 Parental electoral participation 
Both always (n=577) 28 36 
 Only one parent always (n=68) 37 40 
 Both not always (n=305) 56 71 
 Unknown (n=51) 70 81 
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to have parents who always vote develop, as an example,  a strongest link to vote too. 58% of 
the respondents declare their parents always vote, while 31% have no clear parental example 
of voting. 
At the last European elections 2004 when young people have two parents who not always vote, 
their abstention climbs to 71%, when their parents always vote it downs to 36%.  
 
Among young people who vote, what are their choices ? Looking at their partisan proximities we 
have found a general and dominant support for the socialist left and for the Greens, but also 
some sympathies for extremist parties among not educated young people. Do we find a similar 
distribution of their preferences when they vote ? 
 
At the last general elections 2002, six out of ten young people have given their suffrages to the 
left camp : 6% for the extreme-left, 7% for the Communist Party, 26% for the Socialist Party, 
19% for the Greens. The right camp is deserted : 4% for UDF, 13% for UMP and 7% for 
Extreme-right. We can note that 11% have voted white, a significant proportion which expresses 
a certain difficulty to make a choice among the partisan offer.  
 
To understand more precisely the significations and the uses of voting we have distinguished on 
one side the votes for some governmental parties (Socialist Party, UMP, UDF) and on another 
side the votes for parties which stay usually out of the governmental system and which have a 
function of protestation (Extreme-left (LO,LCR,PT), Communist Party, Greens, CPNT (Chasse 
Pêche Nature et Tradition), Extreme-right (FN,MNR)), plus white votes. 
Young people in 2002 have voted more for a party belonging to the second type (47%) than  
for a party of the first type (35%). This confirms the “negative politicisation”, actually very 
present and relevant in the political context in France, using vote more to protest than to signify 
an adhesion to a political project or an identification to a party. This protest voting contributes to 
the crisis of the representative democracy which is deeply installed in France for some years 
now, whatever the colour of the political power. For the first time in France, at the first round of a 
presidential election, extremist parties on the left side and on the right side have together 
gained quite a third of the suffrages in the whole electorate (30%).  
It reveals a real political unrest and a growing lack of confidence towards the classical and 
governmental parties.   
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Table 10: Electoral choices in 2002 
Total 35 47 3 15
Khi-deux
Very, fairly interested(n=150) 41 47 0 11
Not very interested(n=88) 26 45 7 22
Not at all interested(n=46) 33 50 7 11
Gender Khi-deux
Young man (n=41) 41 44 1 14
Young woman (n=29) 29 50 5 15
Khi-deux
YM working/< full maturity (n=52) 29 62 0 10
YW working/< full maturity(n=38) 21 66 3 11
 YM working/>= full maturity(n=35) 46 40 3 11
YW working/>= full maturity(n=39) 36 44 8 13
YM still at school(n=49) 53 27 0 20
YW still at school(n=71) 30 46 6 18
Khi-deux
Left (n=135) 41 49 1 9
Neither nor(n=75) 12 61 7 20
Right (n=57) 61 33 2 4
DK (n=9) 11 44 11 33
AR (n=10) 0 0 0 100
NB: 
Left right scale
0,000
Government parties = PS, UMP, UDF
Others = LO, LCR, PT, PC, Greens, Others mouvements écologistes, FN, MNR,Chasse, pêche, nature et tradition
Political interest
0,004
0,032
Diploma/gender/activity
0,014
Government 
parties
Other parties + 
invalid votes
DK AR
 
 
Gender on this aspect makes differences. Young women are less attracted by governmental 
parties (29%/41%) and use more voting to protest than young men (50%/44%). This 
protestation is still more developed among young women not educated: only 21% of them have 
voted for a governmental party and 66% have voted for a party out of the representative 
system.  
 
The ideological orientation produces also some effects. Protest voting is more widespread 
among leftist than among rightist (49%/33%), but above all concerns young people who have 
some difficulties to locate themselves between the left or the right (61%). Those latter are also 
more instable with their political choices and contribute to the general growing of electoral 
volatility, another characteristic of the crisis of political representation in France. 
 
Young people who have already voted white or who have abstained to protest represent a 
quarter of our sample (24%). These forms of protest concern more the oldest, but also educated 
people more than non educated. They define a kind of behaviour which characterizes a more 
critical citizenship, having a certain political competence and an interest in politics, but 
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expressing a critical distance towards the partisan game. With this kind of behaviour they want 
to weight on the electoral results and to have an impact on the decisions. 
 
Electoral choices of the young people at European elections 2004 are quite similar. Only 41% 
have voted for a governmental party : 26% for the Socialist Party and 15% for UMP and UDF. 
The others, more considered as protest voting, represent a majority, 51%.The Greens had a 
score of 18% ; Extreme left 6% and Communist Party together 8% ; Extreme-right gains 7%. 
Others votes and white votes totalise 12%. 
 
Table 11: Electoral choices in 2004 
11 24 14 13 6 3 10 2 17
Khi-deux
Very, fairly interested(n=178) 13 26 13 14 7 4 8 1 14
Not very interested(n=91) 5 21 19 12 7 1 10 4 21
Not at all interested(n=48) 13 17 10 10 4 2 19 6 19
Gender Khi-deux
Young man (n=153) 7 23 14 16 7 4 10 1 18
Young woman (n=166) 14 24 15 11 5 2 10 4 16
Khi-deux
YM working/< full maturity (n=51) 8 30 12 6 10 8 12 12 12
YW working/< full maturity(n=38) 26 16 13 8 8 5 8 5 11
 YM working/>= full maturity(n=28) 4 18 18 25 7 11 4 14
YW working/>= full maturity(n=35) 9 20 20 9 6 11 9 17
YM still at school(n=71) 7 23 14 18 6 1 7 24
YW still at school(n=92) 10 29 14 13 2 2 10 1 19
Left right scale Khi-deux
Left (n=153) 17 44 18 3 1 1 2 1 13
Neither nor(n=80) 6 8 14 1 8 9 29 6 20
Right (n=62) 3 2 3 58 18 2 6 2 6
DK (n=7) 43 14 14 29
AR (n=13) 100
Diploma/gender/activity
0,140
0,000
Others = Other green movements, MPF and Others
AR
Political interest
0,251
0,437
Ext right Others Invalid votes DKExt left PS + DVG Greens
UMP, UDF, 
DVD
 
 
To conclude this point on electoral participation, we have to keep in mind three main 
results.  
 
The first one is the importance that young people still give to voting. It is not only 
considered as the most effective political action but also as a symbolic link to guarantee 
democracy. 
 
The second one is the importance of the abstention among the youth, even if in our 
survey it appears a bit minimised. One part of this abstention has a political signification 
and is used as a new democratic tool to weight on the political system, especially among 
educated young people and students. Another part is more sociological, and expresses 
less critical attitudes than distance and disinterest towards politics. This sociological 
non voting is more developed among the less educated young people, having already left 
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school, and experiencing difficulties regarding their social integration within the labour 
market. 
 
The third one concerns the growing number of protest votes, giving suffrages to 
extremist parties or to non governmental parties. Gender has a real impact, and young 
women express more choices outside the classical partisan game. The weakness of 
partisan identification  maintains a high level of electoral volatility and contributes to the 
general crisis of the political representation which is deeper among the youth.  
5. Political Participation and Various Types of Involvement 
 
5.1 Effectiveness of participation 
 
French young people believe that voting is the most effective way to influence decisions in 
society (60% believe it is effective). Among those young people who believe in effectiveness of 
voting, we can note that the more people experience social difficulties, the less they are inclined 
to believe in the effectiveness of voting (51% of those who have a low or a very low standard of 
living compared to 77% of those who have a high or very high standard of living). Moreover, 
people who have a low education level less believe that voting is an effective way to influence 
decisions (55% within young working people without diploma compared to 61% within young 
working people with a higher education level). Young working men without diploma are less 
numerous to think that voting is effective (52%). Independently from their education level or 
social situation, young women are more confident in voting than young men. Respondents 
interested in politics are more inclined to believe in voting effectiveness (80% within very/fairly 
interested people compared to 40% within not at all interested group). Young people who 
declare a political orientation are also more entrusting in voting, especially rightists (78% of the 
rightists, 72% of the leftists and 49% of neither nor group). At least, when respondents are 
politically competent, they believe that voting is effective to influence decisions (75% within 
those who have a strong political knowledge compared to 40% of those who have a weak 
knowledge). 
 
Associations also play a prominent role. Indeed 45% of French young people believe it is an 
effect they are favoured, the less they are inclined to believe in associations. When they are 
politicised, they are more inclined to believe in associations’ effectiveness. Nevertheless, we 
can note some specificities: students are more inclined to believe that working in associations is 
an effective way to influence decisions, maybe because they have more time than working 
young people to be involved in such organisations or maybe because they are more in contact 
with them (students associations are very numerous in French universities). Young women are 
also more confident in associations than young men (48% vs. 41%). At least, leftists are more 
entrusting in associations than rightists or neither nor group (respectively 52%, 42%, 40%). 
 
The others forms of participation have a similar effect, as we can see on table 12. After voting 
and being a member of associations, working to get attention from the media and petitions are 
the most effective way to influence decisions, according to French young people (33%), 
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followed by demonstrations (28%). We can note that young people believe in effectiveness of 
political actions such as petitions or demonstrations, even if they are not very involved in these 
activities…  
Political actions, such as working in a political party or contacting politicians are less effective 
according young people (21% and 19%). Only very/fairly interested people and politicised 
people are inclined to be confident in such actions.  
Illegal and violent protest activities are, by a clear majority, regarded as inefficient ways to 
influence decisions (61% of the respondents believe that illegal protest is not effective and 73% 
believe that violence is ineffective). 
 
Figure 2: Effectiveness of ways of participation (11 point scale – recoded) 
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Table 12: Effectiveness of political participation and socio-demographic and political variables 
 
Work in party
Work in 
associations
Vote
Political 
men
Media Boycott Demonstrations
Signing 
petitions
Illegal 
protest
Violent 
protest
Total 21 45 60 19 33 22 28 33 12 8
Khi-deux 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,464
Very, fairly interested(n=354) 32 56 80 24 46 29 44 40 18 10
Not very interested(n=348) 18 39 55 15 28 22 22 31 7 6
Not at all interested(n=290) 12 38 40 16 22 15 13 25 9 7
Khi-deux 0,017 0,493 0,000 0,169 0,131 0,206 0,042 0,000 0,339 0,059
Very low - low(n=193) 19 41 51 17 36 26 26 36 16 11
Medium (n=635) 22 45 58 20 31 20 26 32 11 7
High - very high(n=165) 22 50 77 16 39 27 37 33 10 5
Khi-deux 0,003 0,065 0,101 0,537 0,130 0,146 0,136 0,441 0,307 0,657
Still at school < full maturity(n=433) 18 47 59 18 30 22 26 34 9 7
Still at school >= full maturity(n=204) 30 50 66 20 40 24 33 34 15 10
Workers < full maturity(n=235) 17 38 55 19 30 19 24 32 12 9
Workers >= full maturity(n=125) 26 39 61 20 38 28 30 31 13 7
Khi-deux 0,169 0,040 0,082 0,850 0,341 0,535 0,158 0,040 0,649 0,278
YM working/< full maturity (n=133) 19 39 52 19 28 19 24 30 12 10
YW working/< full maturity(n=103) 14 38 59 18 31 19 24 36 12 6
 YM working/>= full maturity(n=58) 28 36 59 25 46 31 35 33 20 10
YW working/>= full maturity(n=67) 25 41 63 16 30 26 26 29 8 6
YM still at school(n=318) 20 44 60 18 31 23 26 30 10 8
YW still at school(n=320) 24 53 63 19 35 22 30 37 12 8
Status Khi-deux 0,026 0,419 0,312 0,886 0,373 0,822 0,703 0,980 0,385 0,950
In paid work(n=260) 22 42 58 17 32 21 26 31 12 7
At school(n=423) 18 47 59 18 30 22 26 33 10 7
Higher studies(n=198) 30 49 66 20 41 24 33 34 15 10
Unemployed(n=79) 17 35 57 21 29 23 32 33 13 9
Other (n=40) 17 38 50 22 37 22 21 39 9 5
Khi-deux 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
Left (n=359) 27 52 72 20 41 30 42 37 18 9
Neither nor(n=356) 13 40 49 14 23 16 17 29 7 5
Right (n=123) 31 42 78 32 46 23 30 42 12 14
DK (n=114) 22 46 41 18 24 18 15 23 6 7
AR (n=35) 18 28 37 7 31 21 17 38 10 7
Left right scale
Political interest
Actual standard of living
Diploma
Diploma/gender/activity
 
 
 
5.2 Political participation of French young people 
 
During the last twenty years, non conventional political participation has been developed. To 
sign petitions, to demonstrate, to participate to some meetings, or to make strike, have grew up 
and have get progressively more and more legitimacy. In 1981, 31% of the French 18-29 years 
old had already done two or three of these protest actions, in 1999 they were 37%. In the whole 
French population, the increase is even more important : in 1981, 60 years old and more were 
only 13% to have participated to those types of political action, in 1999 they were 31%.2 The 
whole French society gives more and more space to protestation and to participative 
democracy.  
 
The protest action the most widespread among the French youth is to sign a petition. Two third 
of them have already done it (36%). A quarter has already demonstrated or made a strike 
(respectively 26% and 25%). The boycott is less used (17%). Violent political actions stay very 
                                               
2 Pierre Bréchon, « Moins politisés mais plus protestataires », in Olivier Galland et Bernard Roudet (eds), Les 
valeurs des jeunes. Tendances en France depuis 20 ans, L’Harmattan, Paris, 2001. 
 30 
marginal : only 6% have already blocked a street or a railway, 2% have already participated to a 
demonstration with damages.  
Age makes difference : the oldest have more participated to all types of actions than the 
youngest. Gender not so many. But the strongest effect is due to the level of education. 
Educated people and students demonstrate and protest more : 43% of the young who are still 
students after the baccalaureate have already demonstrated, 47% of them have signed a 
petition, 31% have already boycotted a product. 
 
Table 13: Types of political participation (%) 
 
Has already 
… 
1) voted in elections 44 
2) cast an invalid vote 13 
3) not voted out of protest 8 
4) contacted a politician 5 
5) attended a public meeting dealing with 
political or social issues 
10 
6) signed a petition 36 
7) collected signatures 8 
8) held a political speech 2 
9) distributed leaflets with a political content 4 
10) boycotted certain products for political, 
ethical or environmental reasons  
12 
11) bought certain products for political, ethical 
or environmental  reasons  
13 
12) written political messages or graffiti on 
walls 
3 
13) worn a badge with a political message 4 
14) participated in a legal demonstration 26 
15) participated in an illegal demonstration 8 
16) participated in a strike 25 
17) donated money to support the work of a 
political group or organisation 
5 
18) contributed to a political discussion on the 
internet 
6 
19) written an article, e.g. in a students 
newspaper, organisation journal, or the 
internet 
5 
20) written or forwarded a letter/an email with a 
political content 
9 
21) participated in a political event where 
property was damaged 
2 
22) participated in a political event where there 
was a violent confrontation with the police 
3 
23) participated in a political event where there 
was a violent confrontation with political 
opponents 
2 
24) occupied houses, school/university 
buildings factories or government offices 
7 
25) blocked streets or railways 6 
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Political attitudes and orientations are strongly correlated to those kinds of participation. Young 
people more interested in politics participate always more. Among those who are  
very interested and interested 44% have already demonstrated, 55% have signed a petition and 
31% have made a strike. Leftists protest more than rightists. 42% among those who locate 
themselves on the left have already demonstrated, only 20% among those who locate on a right 
position. Those who are neither left nor right always participate less. 
 
Parental participation has also an impact. A quarter of the respondents (23%) declare that their 
parents have already taken part in a demonstration. Young people whom parents have already 
demonstrated demonstrate more than the others (50%). Best friend participation seems still 
more correlated : 59% of those who have a best friend having participated to a demonstration 
do demonstrate. The political homogeneity of the affective and personal context has a great 
influence on the political participation of individuals.  
 
Protest activities depend also on the attitudes and judgments towards the government. Young 
people who express dissatisfaction are more disposed to protest and to demonstrate than the 
others : 37% among young people who are not satisfied with the government Raffarin have 
already demonstrated, only 24% when they are satisfied. 
 
Table 14: Types of political participation crossed by socio-demographic and political variables 
Attented a 
meeting
Signed petition
Boycotted or 
bought
Legal 
demonstration
Illegal 
demonstration
Strike Political mail
Total 10 36 17 26 8 25 9
Khi-deux 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
Very, fairly interested(n=354) 22 55 37 44 13 31 24
Not very interested(n=348) 5 34 9 23 5 27 2
Not at all interested(n=290) 2 17 3 10 5 14 1
Age in 2 categories Khi-deux 0,005 0,000 0,001 0,000 0,005 0,004 0,234
15-17 years (n=297) 5 26 11 14 3 18 8
18-25 years (n=703) 12 41 20 31 9 27 10
Khi-deux 0 0 0 0 0 0 0,073
Still at school < full maturity(n=433) 7 30 13 18 4 20 8
Still at school >= full maturity(n=204) 19 47 31 43 15 38 14
Workers < full maturity(n=235) 7 31 10 22 6 17 7
Workers >= full maturity(n=125) 14 50 24 37 11 33 13
Status Khi-deux 0,004 0,036 0,000 0,000 0,002 0,002 0,059
In paid work(n=260) 10 38 16 27 7 23 11
At school(n=423) 6 31 13 18 4 20 8
Higher studies(n=198) 18 46 31 42 15 37 14
Unemployed(n=79) 10 36 16 35 10 25 6
Other (n=40) 10 35 10 15 5 20
Khi-deux 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,264 0,003 0,000
Left (n=359) 17 50 30 42 11 32 15
Neither nor(n=356) 5 31 11 20 6 20 5
Right (n=123) 11 41 15 20 7 26 15
DK (n=114) 2 12 3 11 4 18 2
AR (n=35) 12 18 21 12 3 15 3
Khi-deux 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,138 0,000 0,000
Both at least once(n=154) 21 53 33 50 10 46 17
Both never(n=678) 7 32 14 20 7 20 7
Only one parent at least once(n=81) 21 55 32 45 12 34 21
Unknown (n=87) 2 22 5 18 3 11 6
Khi-deux 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
At least once (n=189) 26 62 37 59 17 48 26
Never (n=651) 6 31 13 18 6 19 6
DK - AR (n=142) 6 32 11 24 4 18 4
Khi-deux 0,017 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,365 0,024 0,000
Very, fairly satisfied (n=167) 11 32 13 24 5 22 11
Neither, nor (n=355) 6 33 11 19 7 24 4
Not very, not at all satisfied (n=409) 14 45 27 37 10 29 14
DK - AR (n=69) 6 14 3 7 4 12 3
Parental non conventional 
participation
Demonstration of best friend
Satisfaction towards 
government
Political interest
Diploma
Left right scale
 
 
Participation at school is quite important in France. Demonstrations against reforms of the 
educational system are regular. And most of the pupils have already get the opportunity to 
experience this kind of political participation. In the survey, 38% of the young respond they have 
already participated to a demonstration or to a strike at school. These last weeks, French pupils 
have organized a lot of demonstrations against a reform proposed by François Fillon, actual 
Minister of the Educational System. And they have gained. For twenty years now, the young 
people’s protest is so strong that each reform proposed is blocked, whatever the colour of the 
government, left or right. Young people still at school do have a real political weight on the 
governmental decisions concerning the educational system. 
Democratic activity is present in French schools : 40% of the young people have already been 
elected to represented their class. Participation of young people still at work is less developed.   
 
Youth involvement into political organizations or associations is very marginal. Only 1% declare 
to be members of a political party, 1% are members of a trade union, 2% of a human rights 
association, 2% of an environmental association. In France, there are not any more militants 
among the youth. Traditional political engagement is over and is replaced by non formal and 
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spontaneous forms of participation, more specified, with more pragmatic goals, and firstly 
concerning new politics issues. 
 
Youth organizations (10% of members), cultural (11%) and sport associations (31%) are more 
attractive, especially among students. Young men are more numerous to be member of a sport 
club (40%/22%) and young women are more frequently in a cultural association (14%/9%). The 
level of education makes no difference concerning the sport. In return, youth organizations and 
cultural associations are more attractive among young educated people. 
 
Table 15: Involvement in organisations 
 
Member 
Participated in 
activity 
Done 
voluntary 
work 
 Yes Yes Yes 
1) Youth association or youth organisation  10 10 6 
2) Youth organisation of a political party 1 1 1 
3) Religious or church organisation, including religious youth 
organisation 
2 2 1 
4) Trade Union, including youth organisation of a trade union 1 1 0 
5) Political Party  1 1 1 
6) Environmental organisation 2 3 1 
7) Animal rights or animal protection group 2 3 1 
8) Peace organisation 1 2 1 
9) Human rights or Humanitarian Aid organisation 2 3 1 
10) Charity or social-welfare organisation 3 6 3 
11) Consumer association 1 0 0 
12) Cultural, music, dance or theatre group 11 11 4 
13) Women’s organisation 1 0 0 
14) Anti-globalisation organisation 1 1 0 
15) Sports club 31 29 8 
 
 
 
Three main results characterize the political involvement of the French young people 
today. 
First, the survey confirms the fall of traditional militancy. Political parties and trade 
unions are not any more attractive, and the young people are more suspicious about 
them. They don’t want to be prisoners of an organization, they don’t want any more to 
adopt all the obligations and common political objectives that it claims. They probably 
want more to stay free, even free to participate according to their own views, ideas, and 
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methods. There is a kind of privatisation of the political participation. But it does not 
mean they don’t participate. 
Second, according to this last point, protest participation is more and more used and 
legitimated among the population, and especially among the youth. Young French people 
can be described as a protest generation, demonstrating regularly and spontaneously. 
Most of them have demonstrated already at school.      
Third, there is still a cleavage between educated and non educated young people, 
between students and those who have already attended a professional life, most often 
without any diploma. Those who participate the most are the first one. Young people who 
know some difficulties to enter into adulthood and to integrate social life with good 
conditions are less ready to participate, stay more far away from the political system. 
Their dissatisfaction and their protest don’t conduct them to a collective mobilization, 
and even to a personal implication. 
 
 
 
6. Attitudes towards society, confidence in social and political 
institutions 
 
6.1 Attitudes towards society 
 
1.1.1 Standard of living 
 
In our questionnaire we asked young people to tell how they apprehend their actual standard of 
living. This subjective actual standard of living enable us to analyse the way young people 
position themselves in society. 
 
The majority of French young people estimate that their standard of living is on average. 19% 
say they have a low or very low standard of living. 
Women seem to be below average standard of living, but percentages are not statistically 
significant (see Khi-deux). 
Older respondents have a lower standard of living than younger. This can be explained by the 
fact that younger people still live together with their parents and by the fact that older young 
people have more frequently to experience working life and autonomy. Students enjoy a higher 
standard of living, especially if they make higher studies. 
Young active people who have a low level of education are more numerous to face a low 
standard of living (35%). Moreover, young active women without diploma are more inclined to 
say they have a very low standard of living. As we have already noticed during the qualitative 
study, young women with a low education level are a very fragile population. 
In general, we can say that diploma and activity status are discriminating variables with negative 
impact on standard of living. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 36 
Table 16: Actual standard of living 
 
 
2.1.2 Pessimism in apprehending the future 
 
In general, French young people express optimistic feelings when they compare their future 
situation to the actual situation of their parents: 63% think they would have a better income than 
their parents, 66% a better job and 44% a better quality of life and a better education. Social 
security is the topic that raises concerns: 37% of the respondents estimate they will have a 
worse social security and 36% say they will have the same social security as their parents. 
Younger people are more optimistic than older. 
 
People who experience a low or very low standard of living are rather pessimistic when they 
forecast their future: 21% think they will have a worse income, 17% a worse job, 47% a worse 
social security, 38% a worse quality of life and 27% a worse education (for people who have a 
high or very high standard of living, rates are respectively 8%, 7%, 30%, 17% and 13%). 
Diploma and activity status are significant explicative variables regarding apprehension of the 
Total 19 64 17
Gender Khi-deux
Young man (n=510) 18 64 18
Young woman (n=490) 21 64 16
Age in 4 categories Khi-deux
15-17 years (n=297) 13 63 24
18-20 years (n=298) 15 67 18
21-23 years (n=231) 25 62 13
24-25 years (n=173) 29 64 8
Khi-deux
Still at school < full maturity(n=433) 13 66 21
Still at school >= full maturity(n=204) 15 60 25
Workers < full maturity(n=235) 35 60 6
Workers >= full maturity(n=125) 18 73 10
Khi-deux
YM working/< full maturity (n=133) 32 61 7
YW working/< full maturity(n=103) 39 57 4
 YM working/>= full maturity(n=58) 15 75 10
YW working/>= full maturity(n=67) 20 71 9
YM still at school(n=318) 13 64 24
YW still at school(n=320) 15 64 21
Status Khi-deux
In paid work(n=260) 22 69 9
At school(n=423) 13 67 20
Higher studies(n=198) 15 59 26
Unemployed(n=79) 42 52 6
Other (n=40) 54 44 2
0,000
0
Diploma
 0,000
Diploma/gender/activity
0,000
Very low - low Average
High - very 
high
0,486
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future. Young active people who have a low education level are more pessimistic: 18% say they 
will have a worse income than their parents and 15% a worse job (the rates are respectively 
11% and 10%for young active people with higher level of education). Of course, unemployed 
young people are also very pessimistic: 20% estimate they will have a worse income than their 
parents and 16% a worse job (rates are respectively 13% and 12% for in paid work people). 
NB: Regarding quality of life and education percentages are not statistically significant. 
 
The apprehension of the future social security is quite different. Indeed, contrary to the other 
items, it is the most educated and the most politicised young people who are the most 
pessimistic. 45% of those who make higher studies think that they will have a worse social 
security than their parents. Among the respondents who have a paid job, those who have a 
high-school diploma are more pessimistic than those who have no diploma (42% of working 
men with full maturity vs. 40% of working men without diploma and 45% of working women with 
full maturity vs. 34% of working women without diploma). The question of social security is also 
a more politicized issue : young people who are leftist are more inclined to be pessimistic (40%) 
than the rightists (34%), we find here the traditional political cleavage, with a left-wing more 
concerned by social problems. We can also note that the more people are interested in politics, 
the more they are anxious for their future social security: 40% of those who have a political 
interest filiation and 48% of those who move to political interest say they will have a worse 
social security than their parents. 
Moreover, 42% of the young people having a medium strong political knowledge say they will 
have a worse social security than their parents (vs. 35% of those who have a medium weak 
knowledge). Political participation is also an explicative variable: those with at least one parent 
having already taken part in a demonstration or being regular electors are more pessimistic than 
those with parents non politically involved or voting sporadically (41% and 40% vs. 37% and 
37%). 
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Table 17: Pessimism in apprehending the future 
 
 
 
3.1.3 France’s main problems 
 
For French young people, unemployment and poverty are the most important issues that France 
is facing today . Immigration is the less important. This result is not surprising, when we know 
that economical and professional situation of young people in France is particularly alarming. 
According to the latest published statistics, the unemployment rate within 18-25 years old raises 
21%. French young people are the first victims of the economical crisis. 
Young women seem to be more concerned than young men (except for immigration). 
Total 14 11 37 27 19
Age in 2 categories Khi-deux 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,003 0,057
15-17 years (n=297) 11 8 30 24 17
18-25 years (n=703) 15 12 41 28 20
Khi-deux 0,000 0,000 0,003 0,000 0,008
Very low - low(n=193) 21 17 47 38 27
Medium (n=635) 13 10 37 26 18
High - very high(n=165) 8 7 30 17 13
Khi-deux 0,000 0,002 0,001 0,527 0,083
Still at school < full maturity(n=433) 12 9 31 24 18
Still at school >= full maturity(n=204) 12 10 46 28 20
Workers < full maturity(n=235) 18 15 38 29 20
Workers >= full maturity(n=125) 11 10 44 28 18
Khi-deux 0,002 0,030 0,826 0,867 0,820
YM working/< full maturity (n=133) 20 18 40 32 21
YW working/< full maturity(n=103) 17 13 34 24 19
 YM working/>= full maturity(n=58) 10 10 42 29 17
YW working/>= full maturity(n=67) 12 11 45 27 20
YM still at school(n=318) 10 7 36 25 19
YW still at school(n=320) 14 11 36 26 18
Status Khi-deux 0,000 0,001 0,003 0,369 0,048
In paid work(n=260) 13 12 40 28 20
At school(n=423) 13 9 32 24 18
Higher studies(n=198) 13 10 45 27 19
Unemployed(n=79) 20 16 41 33 26
Other (n=40) 18 10 29 23 8
Khi-deux 0,000 0,000 0,009 0,000 0,000
Left (n=359) 13 11 40 27 19
Neither nor(n=356) 13 11 38 27 19
Right (n=123) 13 7 34 22 19
NA (n=14) 21 14 50 29 29
DK (n=114) 18 12 27 26 17
AR (n=35) 18 12 50 26 18
Khi-deux 0,006 0,017 0,063 0,874 0,191
Weak (n=161) 14 11 34 26 14
Medium weak (n=343) 16 13 35 26 22
Medium strong (n=375) 11 9 42 29 19
Strong (n=121) 12 10 36 22 14
Left right scale
Political knowledge
Income Education
Actual standard of living
Diploma
Diploma/gender/activity
Professional 
situation
Social 
security
Quality of life
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Concerning unemployment, young people aged between 18 and 25 years old are the most 
concerned by this issue (82%), surely because contrary to the younger they are or will be soon 
in paid work and have to face this problem concretely. Young people who experience social 
difficulties are also more worried by unemployment, thus 81% of those who have a low or a very 
low standard of living think it is a very important issue. Young people who are less educated or 
whose parents have no full maturity degree are more inclined to think that unemployment is a 
very important problem (86% and 80%). Among the less favoured young people, working 
women with low education level are the most worried by unemployment (87%). We can note 
that political variables are not statistically significant regarding unemployment, it is a social 
problem which goes beyond traditional political cleavages. 
 
Concerning crimes and violence, which is the third most important problem (72% of the 
respondents think it is a very important problem) we can note both a social and a political 
cleavage. Working young people with low education level are more concerned by this problem 
than students or working high educated people (79% of working people without diploma think it 
is very important vs. 70% of working people with diploma or students). Moreover, 79% of the 
young people whose parents have no full maturity degree think that crimes and violence are 
very important problems, whereas 65% of those whose parents have a full maturity degree 
share the same opinion. Young women seem more worried than young men. While violence is 
more frequent in the urban areas, only 64% of the young people who live in these areas think 
that it is an important problem; whereas 79% of the young people living in a rural area fell 
concern by crimes and violence. It is a well-known phenomenon that people who do not actually 
face violence or crimes meanwhile being influenced by media coverage, are more frightened 
than people who are confronted to them. The less young people are interested in politics, the 
more they tend to think that crimes and violence are very important problems (75% of not very 
interested people and 72% of not at all interested people vs. 68% of interested people). 
Moreover, if their parents are politically active, they tend to be less concern by these problems 
(only 62% of the young people whose both parents have already taken part in a demonstration 
think it is a very important problem). In addition, 81% of the young people who have a weak 
political knowledge consider that violence is a very important problem, they are only 67% to 
think the same among those who have a strong political knowledge. We can also note a left-
right cleavage regarding this problem: young rightist people are more inclined to consider it as a 
very important issue than leftists (81% of rightist young people and 86% of those who have a 
right filiation vs 63% of leftist young people and 61% of those who have a left filiation). 
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Concerning the cut down on the welfare state benefits (55% of French young people think it is a 
very important problem), we can note that both less favoured people and leftists feel more 
concerned by this problem. 60% of those who have a low or a very low standard of living 
consider it is a very important issue and young working women without not diploma are 
particularly worried by it (69%). Whereas only 41% of the rightist young people think that 
reduction of the welfare state is an important issue, they are 60% within the leftist. 
 
Less educated people and less favoured people tend to consider that number of immigrants is 
an important issue that France has to deal with: more than half of the working people without full 
maturity degree think it is important and 45% of those who experience a low or very low 
standard of living. 
 
At least, we can note that young Muslims tend to be more concerned by poverty, 
unemployment, racism, drug and the reduction of welfare State, than other young people; 
probably because they are more touched by these problems, as they are a less favoured 
population. On the contrary, Catholics, who are, for a majority of them, more favoured, tend to 
be more worried by violence and terrorism. 
 
Table 18: The most important problems in France 
 
 
Pollution Poverty Immigration Racism
Welfare 
state
Unemployment Drug
Crimes 
violence
Terrorism
Total 64 75 45 62 55 77 63 72 66
Gender Khi-deux 0,004 0,050 0,560 0,082 0,033 0,208 0,001 0,056 0,313
Young man (n=510) 59 72 46 58 51 75 59 68 64
Young woman (n=490) 69 78 44 65 59 79 68 75 69
Khi-deux 0,703 0,258 0,001 0,206 0,006 0,000 0,012 0,982 0,953
Very low - low(n=193) 64 79 45 58 60 81 65 73 66
Medium (n=635) 65 75 47 61 55 78 65 72 67
High - very high(n=165) 63 71 37 67 47 73 54 71 64
Khi-deux 0,864 0,345 0,654 0,862 0,000 0,006 0,049 0,179 0,006
Still at school < full maturity(n=433) 65 74 44 64 50 71 62 70 67
Still at school >= full maturity(n=204) 61 75 39 60 56 81 55 68 58
Workers < full maturity(n=235) 63 79 52 60 64 86 72 79 75
Workers >= full maturity(n=125) 69 70 45 60 50 77 66 70 62
Khi-deux 0,100 0,143 0,910 0,701 0,001 0,024 0,004 0,035 0,033
YM working/< full maturity (n=133) 56 78 50 58 61 84 68 80 72
YW working/< full maturity(n=103) 73 79 54 62 69 87 76 78 78
 YM working/>= full maturity(n=58) 61 68 49 51 54 83 61 69 56
YW working/>= full maturity(n=67) 76 71 41 67 45 72 70 71 66
YM still at school(n=318) 60 71 43 60 46 70 55 64 62
YW still at school(n=320) 67 78 42 66 58 78 65 75 67
Khi-deux 0,156 0,057 0,000 0,020 0,001 0,910 0,000 0,000 0,081
Catholics (n=461) 66 71 48 60 50 76 67 75 71
Muslims (n=72) 54 85 38 78 68 81 71 74 60
Other religions (n=43) 60 74 51 65 60 81 57 74 67
No religion(n=391) 64 77 42 61 59 77 58 68 62
Khi-deux 0,159 0,035 0,000 0,313 0,000 0,604 0,002 0,002 0,000
Left (n=359) 67 80 38 62 60 78 55 63 54
Neither nor(n=356) 62 73 43 63 52 76 62 74 70
Right (n=123) 63 65 62 54 41 78 76 81 80
NA (n=14) 79 79 71 71 86 79 86 79 86
DK (n=114) 61 74 49 64 54 76 75 78 74
AR (n=35) 56 77 51 57 65 77 74 85 74
Diploma
Diploma/gender/activity
Religion
Left right scale
Actual standard of living
6.2 Political trust 
 
1.2.1 Trust in political institutions 
 
65% of the French youth do not trust politicians at all or a little bit, which is not very surprising 
as, in France, politicians are not highly regarded. Political parties and the government also don’t 
enjoy esteem as people tend to feel distrust for them respectively 58% and 54% of the young 
people do not have confidence in those institutions. 
The national parliament, the European Community and the European Parliament generate a 
medium level of confidence. The fact that French young people trust more the European 
institutions than the national ones is quite surprising. 
Amnesty International (36%) and Greenpeace (31%) are the organizations that the French 
youth trusts most. In general they are more confident in NGO’s than in political institutions.  
 
Table 19: Trust in political institutions 
 
We built an indicator of trust in political institutions with the answers given to question 51 item 1 
to item 6 (political institutions): we counted people who choose to answer “not at all”, and we 
obtained a scale ranging from 0 (very strong trust in political institutions) to 5 (very weak trust in 
political institutions). In this part of the report, we analyse the profile of the young people who 
have a low level of confidence in the political institutions. 
12% of our sample have no trust in the political institutions (see table 18). Less favoured people 
and a-political people are less inclined to be entrusting. 
Regarding socio-demographic variables, older young people are less confident than older (13% 
vs. 9%). People who experience a low or a very low standard of living  are more circumspect 
Trust in…. Not at all/a little bit Neither-nor Very much/much 
Politicians 65 27 8 
Parties 58 34 8 
Government 54 34 12 
Parliament 52 34 14 
European Community 48 36 17 
European Parliament 47 35 18 
Attac 43 38 19 
Greenpeace 37 32 31 
Amnesty International 32 32 36 
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about political institutions (15%). Young women are less confident than young men, especially 
young working women without diploma (20%). Young people in paid work or unemployed 
people do not trust political institution very much (15%). Less educated young people also tend 
to be less confident than those who have a high education level (11% the students under full 
maturity degree and 19% of working people without a maturity degree). 
Confident they are ( 20% of those who are not at all interested in politics have a very weak trust 
in political institution whereas the rate is only 6% for those who are very or fairly interested). 
Linked with political interest, people who have no political orientation have also a weaker trust in 
political institutions (14% of those who are neither rightist nor leftist and 35% of those who 
refuse to give a political orientation). Moreover, young people who have a weak or a medium 
weak political knowledge are those who are the most circumspect about political institutions 
(16% and 13%). 
 
2.2.2 Satisfaction towards the French government 
 
Only 2% of the French youth is very satisfied with the French government. Most of them, 41% 
are dissatisfied/very dissatisfied with the government. 
Young people at the age of 15-18 years are a little bit more satisfied than the average of the 
French youth (30%). 
People who have a low or a very low standard of living and working people without diploma are 
more dissatisfied (respectively 53% and 50%). Within these less favoured young people, 
unemployed are the most discontented  (55%). In addition, we can see that the less the people 
are politically competent, the more dissatisfied they are (55% of those who have a weak political 
knowledge and 46% of those who have a medium weak knowledge). 
Regarding political variables, we can note that the more the people are involved in politics and 
the more leftist they are, the more dissatisfied they are. 50% of people who are very or fairly 
interested in politics are discontented with the government (compared to 36% for those who are 
not very or not at all interested). 55% of the young people who position themselves on the left 
are critical towards the government, which is not surprising as insofar as the French government 
is rightist. Maybe it is more surprising to see that 23% of the rightist are also discontented. 
Political involvement is also a significant variable, indeed, young people whose parents have 
already taken part in a demonstration or always vote are more inclined to be critical towards the 
government. 
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Table 20: Trust in political institutions and dissatisfaction towards government 
 
Three main results characterize the French young people’s attitudes towards society and 
confidence in social and political institutions. 
 
Strong
Not very, not at all 
satisfied
Total 12 41
Khi-deux 0,000 0,000
Very, fairly interested(n=354) 6 50
Not very interested(n=348) 10 36
Not at all interested(n=290) 20 36
Age in 2 categories Khi-deux 0,006 0,000
15-17 years (n=297) 9 30
18-25 years (n=703) 13 45
Khi-deux 0,000 0,000
Very low - low(n=193) 15 53
Medium (n=635) 13 38
High - very high(n=165) 2 40
Khi-deux 0,000 0,000
Still at school < full maturity(n=433) 11 31
Still at school >= full maturity(n=204) 6 48
Workers < full maturity(n=235) 19 50
Workers >= full maturity(n=125) 9 45
Khi-deux 0,000 0,005
YM working/< full maturity (n=133) 19 50
YW working/< full maturity(n=103) 20 50
 YM working/>= full maturity(n=58) 3 46
YW working/>= full maturity(n=67) 14 44
YM still at school(n=318) 8 40
YW still at school(n=320) 11 34
Status Khi-deux 0,000 0,000
In paid work(n=260) 15 50
At school(n=423) 11 31
Higher studies(n=198) 6 48
Unemployed(n=79) 15 52
Other (n=40) 23 30
Khi-deux 0,000 0,000
Left (n=359) 8 55
Neither nor(n=356) 14 36
Right (n=123) 9 27
NA (n=14) 14 8
DK (n=114) 12 25
AR (n=35) 35 59
Khi-deux 0,000 0,000
Weak (n=161) 16 31
Medium weak (n=343) 13 35
Medium strong (n=375) 9 46
Strong (n=121) 10 55
Left right scale
Political knowledge
Distrust in political 
institutions
Satisfaction towards 
government
Political interest
Actual standard of living
Diploma
Diploma/gender/activity
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Even if they express optimistic feelings when they forecast their future, they are very 
worried by unemployment and social security. Concerning these issues, social status 
and education are particularly cleaving: the more young people are educated, the more 
they have an optimistic apprehension of the society and of the future. Young people who 
encounter social difficulties tend to be more pessimistic and more concerned by socio-
economical problems. 
 
Political institutions suffer from a deficit of confidence: young people do not trust them 
anymore , especially politicians. They give more trust to NGO’s such as Amnesty 
International or Greenpeace. Trust in political institutions is strongly linked to social 
background and political interest. Young people who experience social difficulties tend 
to be more distrustful , whereas young people interested in politics seem a little bit more 
trustful. 
 
At least, young people are not very satisfied with the actual French government and this 
dissatisfaction is generalised. People who have a low standard of living and a low 
education level tend to be the most discontented. We can also notice, that the more the 
respondents are politically competent or interested and the more they are dissatisfied. 
 
 
 
 
7. Belongings, beliefs and values 
 
7.1 Identity  
 
An analysis of the sense of identity shows that : 
- Young French feel first and foremost to be part of their family (91% position themselves 
on point 5 or 4). 
- National and regional identity follow familial identity (respectively 80% and 66%). 
- Then come the identification with the school/university (57%) and with the work place 
(45%). 
- The supra-national dimensions – Europe and world – come last (respectively 43% and 
33%) 
 
Regarding national identity, we can see that Muslim young people do not have a strong feeling 
of belonging to the national community (47%); they are also more inclined to declare 
themselves as being citizens of the world (43%). This may be explained by the fact that they 
probably are from immigrant origins, so they may have a dual cultural background. They are 
also less favoured people, so they may feel a little bit excluded from the national community. 
18-25 year old respondents have a stronger sense of trans-national identity (World citizen: 36% 
“very strong/strong” compared to 29% in the younger age group) 
The more the respondents have a high level of education, the more inclined they are to feel 
European (for instance, 59% of those who made higher studies feel European).  
Political interest and ideological orientation are also significant variables: the less the 
respondents are interested in politics, the less they feel to be part of the world or of the 
European Union (World citizen: 24% “very strong/strong” within not at all interested people 
compared to 45% within very/fairly interested people; European: 28% “very strong/strong” 
compared to 57% in the very/fairly interested group). Young people who declare an ideological 
orientation tend to be more European than those who are neither rightist nor leftist, and the 
leftist are a little bit more European than rightist (54%”very strong/strong” within the leftists 
compared to 48% within the rightists and 34% within neither-nor). The leftists are more inclined 
to declare themselves citizens of the world than the rightists, who are more “patriotic”.(Citizen of 
the world: 44% “very strong/strong” among the leftists compared to 29% within the rightists; 
French: 80% “very strong/strong” within the leftists compared to 91% within the rightists). 
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Table 21: Identity (positions 4 and 5 on the scale) 
 
 
7.2 Religion 
 
In France, Catholicism is still the major religion, 48% of the respondents declare themselves as 
being Catholics. Nevertheless, an increasing number of people declare to have no religion, and 
Total 33 43 80 66
Khi-deux 0,000 0,000 0,060 0,028
Very, fairly interested(n=354) 45 57 83 63
Not very interested(n=348) 30 42 82 69
Not at all interested(n=290) 24 28 75 68
Age in 2 categories Khi-deux 0,005 0,527 0,861 0,084
15-17 years (n=297) 29 42 80 71
18-25 years (n=703) 36 44 81 64
Khi-deux 0,000 0,000 0,425 0,595
Still at school < full maturity(n=433) 30 41 79 67
Still at school >= full maturity(n=204) 44 58 81 63
Workers < full maturity(n=235) 26 34 80 70
Workers >= full maturity(n=125) 42 45 82 63
Khi-deux 0,117 0,003 0,227 0,326
YM working/< full maturity (n=133) 29 32 76 64
YW working/< full maturity(n=103) 24 38 85 77
 YM working/>= full maturity(n=58) 44 53 84 59
YW working/>= full maturity(n=67) 42 38 82 68
YM still at school(n=318) 35 48 83 66
YW still at school(n=320) 34 45 77 66
Status Khi-deux 0,044 0,002 0,335 0,088
In paid work(n=260) 34 40 81 69
At school(n=423) 30 41 79 67
Higher studies(n=198) 44 59 82 62
Unemployed(n=79) 33 35 78 59
Other (n=40) 24 30 88 80
Khi-deux 0,197 0,063 0,000 0,026
Catholics (n=461) 34 48 87 71
Muslims (n=72) 43 33 47 59
Other religions (n=43) 36 35 76 57
No religion(n=391) 32 40 79 63
Khi-deux 0,000 0,000 0,183 0,045
Left (n=359) 44 54 80 63
Neither nor(n=356) 27 34 77 68
Right (n=123) 29 48 91 74
DK (n=114) 27 37 81 67
AR (n=35) 41 38 83 54
Khi-deux 0,000 0,000 0,548 0,828
Weak (n=161) 20 30 76 66
Medium weak (n=343) 28 37 78 66
Medium strong (n=375) 40 48 83 67
Strong (n=121) 50 64 83 68
Left right scale
Political knowledge
Political interest
Diploma
Diploma/gender/activity
Religion
World Europe France Region
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among the respondents the percentage raises 40%.7% of the responds are Muslim, so Islam is 
the second French religious denomination.  
French young people are not very religious, 70% of the respondents declare themselves as 
being a little religious or not at all religious. Only 8% of the respondents are very religious. 
Muslim young people are the most faithful (78% of them are very religious or religious). 
Catholics are the less religious people (37%), this may confirm the fact that in France a majority 
of people declares themselves as being Catholics, but the religious observance falls down. 
 
Table 22: Religious denomination in France 
 
Table 23: Religiousness (%) 
 
We can note some socio-demographic differences among the religious groups. Muslim young 
people are the less favoured group: 31% declare themselves as having a low or a very low 
standard of living and 10% of the Muslim respondents are unemployed. Whereas only 7% of the 
young working Muslims have a high education level, the rate reach 14% among the young 
working Catholics and 10% among the other religions group. 
 
 
7.3 Political values and attitudes 
 
In order to analyse French youth’s values and attitudes we built 3 indicators with the answers 
given to question 50. 
 
 
Very 
religious 
Religious 
 
A little 
religious 
Not religious 
 
Catholics 7 30 46 17 
Muslims 44 34 18 4 
Other religions 19 29 30 22 
No religion 1 4 16 79 
Total 10 20 30 40 
 
Denomination Number Percentage 
Catholics 461 48 
Muslims 72 7 
Other religions 42 4 
No religion 391 40 
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7.3.1 Economical liberalism 
The first indicator is related to economical liberalism. We counted the answers given to item 10 
to 18 (items 11, 17 and 18 were recoded in order to be in the same direction as the others). If 
respondents disagree with all items, they are not at all liberal; it they agree with one item they 
are a little liberal; if they agree with 2 or 3 item they are almost liberal and if they agree with 4, 5 
or 6 items they are liberal. 
French young people are not very liberal, indeed, as shown in table 22, only 15% of them are 
liberal whereas 30% are not at all liberal, and we can note that no respondent agree with all the 
8 items. 
Concerning liberalism, gender and age are not statistically significant. The social situation and 
the left-right cleavage are the most significant variables to explain attitudes towards liberalism. 
16% of the young people who experience a high/very high standard of living are liberal 
compared to 9% of those who experience a low/very low standard of living. 
As expected, leftists are more inclined to be not at all liberal (37%) whereas rightists are 
strongly liberal (29%). The left right cleavage is still relevant, but probably less and less 
cleaving, as 39% of the leftist have liberal attitudes. 
 
Table 24: Economical liberalism 
 
 
Total 30 25 30 15
Khi-deux
Very low - low(n=193) 38 25 27 9
Medium (n=635) 28 26 30 16
High - very high(n=165) 28 22 35 16
Khi-deux
Left (n=359) 37 24 28 11
Neither nor(n=356) 28 26 33 13
Right (n=123) 15 24 32 29
DK (n=114) 40 25 25 10
AR (n=35) 20 29 29 23
Khi-deux
Filia Right  (n=81) 17 20 33 30
Filia Left (n=267) 38 22 27 12
Filia Neither nor(n=338) 32 25 29 14
Incohérence (n=90) 22 27 37 13
Changement (n=44) 30 34 20 16
Décrochage (n=101) 27 25 36 12
Filiation politique
0,000
Standard of living
0,055
Left right scale
0,000
Not at all 
liberal
A little liberal
Almost 
liberal
Liberal
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7.3.2 Tolerance 
The second indicator measures the capacity of young people to be tolerant towards immigrant 
people and other cultures. It is based on answers given to item 5 (recoded) to item 7. 
Respondents are tolerant if they disagree with all items or if they only agree with one item; they 
are intolerant if they agree with 2 or 3 items. 
More than half of the respondents express tolerance towards others. Young women seem to be 
more open-minded than the young men (60% vs. 57%, but the khi-deux is not very significant). 
Younger people are more tolerant than people aged between 18-25 years old (63% vs. 56%). 
Diploma is a discriminating variable which can explain variation in the opening to others: the 
more the people are educated, the more opened they are. For instance, young working people 
without diploma are only 46% to be opened, whereas 56% of young working people with higher 
diploma are tolerant. Young people who are still in the educational system, at every level, are 
more opened than those who work (64% of the students are opened compared to 50% of the 
working people). People who live in urban area are more opened than people living in rural 
area, that can be explain by the fact that urban area are more mixed. We can note that Muslim 
young people are the most tolerant, 88% of them are opened to others, maybe because they 
are from immigrant origins. Attitudes towards politics are also explicative variables: the more 
interested the people are, the more opened they are (65% of the very/fairly interested people 
compared to 48% of the not at all interested people).The left right cleavage is very significant: 
72% of the leftists are opened to others, whereas only 28% of the rightists are tolerant. 
 
 
7.3.3 Authoritarianism 
The last indicator measures authoritarianism. It based on the answers given to items 1 to 4. If 
respondent agree with 3 or 4 items, they are authoritarian. 48% of the respondents are 
authoritarian, which is quite surprising for young people… We do not note any differences 
related to age, but gender is more effective. Young women are more authoritarian than young 
men (52% vs 48%), while at the same time they seem to be more opened to others. The young 
women facing social difficulties are the most authoritarian (65%). In general, social status and 
diploma may explain the variations: the less educated the people are, the more authoritarian 
they are (59% of working people those who have a low education level are authoritarian 
whereas only 46% of working people with higher diploma are authoritarian). Working people are 
more authoritarian than students. 
Like for tolerance towards others, the political variables explain the majority of the variations. 
The more interested in politics the people are, the less authoritarian they are (39% vs. 61%). 
The left right cleavage is even more important, indeed 70% of the rightists are authoritarian 
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whereas only 36% of the leftists reach a high level of authoritarianism. Nevertheless, even 
among the leftists, the rate of authoritarianism is quite important.  
At least, political competence is also an effective variable: 58% of the young people who have a 
weak political knowledge are authoritarian, they are only 39% among those who have a strong 
political knowledge. 
This high level of authoritarianism is an unexpected, and quite alarming, result of our survey. 
Since few years, we have to face a new tendency: French young people are more and more in 
demand of authority, especially among the lower social classes. 
Table 25: Tolerance and authoritarianism 
 
 
To conclude this point on identity and political values, we can keep in mind three main 
results. 
 
Autoritarian Tolerant
Total 48 58
Khi-deux 0,000 0,000
Very, fairly interested(n=354) 39 65
Not very interested(n=348) 47 59
Not at all interested(n=290) 61 48
Gender Khi-deux 0,028 0,653
Young man (n=510) 48 57
Young woman (n=490) 52 60
Age in 2 categories Khi-deux 0,595 0,820
15-17 years (n=297) 51 63
18-25 years (n=703) 51 56
Khi-deux 0,012 0,210
Very low - low(n=193) 48 59
Medium (n=635) 51 53
High - very high(n=165) 37 66
Khi-deux 0,008 0,000
Still at school < full maturity(n=433) 48 63
Still at school >= full maturity(n=204) 37 65
Workers < full maturity(n=235) 59 46
Workers >= full maturity(n=125) 46 56
Khi-deux 0,117 0,000
YM working/< full maturity (n=133) 54 49
YW working/< full maturity(n=103) 65 42
 YM working/>= full maturity(n=58) 50 44
YW working/>= full maturity(n=67) 42 66
YM still at school(n=318) 41 64
YW still at school(n=320) 49 63
Status Khi-deux 0,080 0,000
In paid work(n=260) 53 50
At school(n=423) 46 62
Higher studies(n=198) 37 66
Unemployed(n=79) 48 56
Other (n=40) 66 40
Khi-deux 0,000 0,000
Left (n=359) 36 72
Neither nor(n=356) 51 56
Right (n=123) 70 28
DK (n=114) 46 63
AR (n=35) 66 31
Khi-deux 0,000 0,633
Weak (n=161) 58 60
Medium weak (n=343) 53 55
Medium strong (n=375) 43 60
Strong (n=121) 39 62
Diploma
Diploma/gender/activity
Left right scale
Political knowledge
Political interest
Actual standard of living
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French young people feel more to be part of their country than of Europe. European 
identity is not yet very firmly rooted in French people mind. Only people with an higher 
education level tend to really feel as European. 
 
Even if only 15% of the respondents are liberal, we can notice an increasing acceptation 
of the liberal economical model among French society. 
 
Unexpected result of our survey was the almost high level of authoritarianism within 
French youth. It is a new tendency which appears since some years: whereas French 
young people are almost tolerant , they are also more and more in demand of authority, 
especially within the lower social classes. 
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8. Summary of the most important results on political 
participation 
 
The political picture we have given of the French youth shows different characteristics 
and specificities we would like to underline. 
 
The first one concerns the general attitude French young people have towards 
politics. A strong distrust and a very deep lack of confidence are more and more 
widespread. This negative perception causes a great distance towards politics and a 
general suspicion towards politicians, or at the very least, a critical attitude which is 
more and more spread even among young educated and politicised young people. 
These both reactions indicate the importance in France of the crisis of the political 
representation and of the partisan system, which is especially problematical among 
the youth. Partisan identification is very weak and traditional political organisations 
are not attractive any more. 
Despite of this strong distrust, French young people are still somewhat politicised. 
Their interest in politics is equivalent to this one we can notice among the elders. But 
a gender gap is significant. Young men have more familiarity with politics and more 
knowledge about it than women. 
If young people do interest in politics more or less like the elders they feel less 
concerned by the institutional system and by the partisan game. They are more 
preoccupied by issues directly connected to the social life and to new politics, as 
human rights, antiracism, social justice, equality…Most of them can spontaneously 
participate to collective protests and demonstration defending such reasons. Despite 
of this aptitude for protestation and the attention they give to these universals, their 
engagement in associations or new politics organisations stays low. 
 
The second one is the attachment French young people still have for the 
representative democracy. They do consider voting as the most effective democratic 
tool. Even if they abstain more than the elders , voting is still the most symbolic link to 
guarantee democracy. 
Abstention is growing among the whole French electorate. Nevertheless it does not 
mean only indifference towards politics. Non voting is also more and more used as a 
protest tool, especially among young educated people who are interested in politics 
and even who can have a partisan proximity. The alternance of voting , non voting and 
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demonstrating is more and more widespread among the French educated youth and 
define new kinds of citizenship. Political participation combines representative 
democracy and participative democracy. Young people express their choices and their 
political behaviours according to this enlargement of the political action. 
 
The third one concerns their ideological orientations. Despite the fact more and more 
young people do not situate themselves between the left and the right, among those 
who still choose a camp, there are more leftists than rightists. Socialist Party and the 
Greens are the most attractive. Classical rightists parties (UDF,UMP) are less popular 
at the moment, and most of the young express dissatisfaction towards the actual 
government. We can notice that gender has a real impact. Young women express 
more often some electoral choices outside the classical partisan game and are more 
numerous to choose alternative parties. 
 
The fourth result of our study , and may be the most relevant to understand the 
relationship between French young people and politics today concerns the social 
fracture within they do experiment. The gap between educated and not educated 
young, having already left school and experiencing difficulties to enter on the labour 
market, is huge. This educational gap has a strong impact on their political attitudes 
and behaviours. Less young people are educated, less they are interested in politics 
and also less they feel competent. If general attitudes towards politics are for most 
young people negative, the lack of confidence and the distrust are particularly 
problematical among the not educated ones. 
Political participation also depends on the level of education. Less young people are 
educated less they do participate, whatever the type of participation. They vote less 
and they also demonstrate less. They stay more distant and more indifferent towards 
the political game. They do not use any democratic tools, conventional or 
unconventional ones, to express their demands or their opinions. This critical 
distance conducts some of them to feel more attracted by extremists right parties and 
by authoritarian issues. 
 
Lastly, we can notice some trends which reveal recent new cleavages within the 
French society : 
- the acceptation of the economical liberalism  is more and more widespread, 
even among the young leftists 
- the demand of authority is quite high, even among young people who are used 
to be more tolerant 
 55 
 
These new trends produce new political attitudes and behaviours which can have 
middle-dated unexpected effects on the electoral game, and more largely on the 
democratic system. 
 
 
 
